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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the beliefs and practices that collectivism engenders in Uganda and how 
they may influence the principal-agent relationships present in the situation of “corruption”. Within 
some specific contexts of collectivism, vices that may qualify to be corruption may be interpreted 
otherwise as long as they are perceived not only serve only individual but also group or community 
goals. The paper shows that in some societies in Uganda, corruption or even theft can be acceptable as 
long as it is perceived to bring benefits to the family, kinship or community. The paper argues that the 
drivers and manifestations of corruption in Uganda cannot be understood without reference to beliefs 
and practices engendered by collectivism. It provides examples that show that in quite many 
collectivistic cultures, acceptance or rejection of corruption depends on the contextual interpretations of 
the act and the perception and meaning attached to the party to whom the act has been committed. In 
some cases, especially where the state has either lost or has never gained legitimacy among some 
sections of the population; stealing state funds may be interpreted as being “smart” rather than immoral. 
This tendency towards conceptualizing ‘corruption’ as something that takes place only when the 
individual does not share his loot with others but enjoys its benefits alone contributes to making 
individuals shun the individual responsibility for their corrupt actions and complicates the moral issues 
related to corruption in the context of collectivism. It could be that the level of individuals’ sense of 
responsibility for their actions in collectivistic environments is lower thus making interventions that 
solely focus on individual retribution less effective in combating corruption. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Corruption has been conceptualized variously by scholars from different academic 
disciplines. Economic theorists for example analyse corruption from a formal institutional point 
of view. They focus largely on the interactions between public servants and private citizens 
with a view of maximizing their own expected incomes or profits on one hand, and the 
institutions designed to deter public officials from abusing their positions. The main assumption 
is that “when the private returns to corruption are higher, due to weak institutions, the likelihood 
or consequences of detection are limited and individuals are more likely to act corruptly”. 
Corruption, broadly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain by the World- Bank, 
International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences Online: 2013-09-25
ISSN: 2300-2697, Vol. 5, pp 27-44
doi:10.18052/www.scipress.com/ILSHS.5.27
© 2013 SciPress Ltd., Switzerland
This is an open access article under the CC-BY 4.0 license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
 has been acknowledged as a universal problem (Mishra 2005, 349; Desta, 2004, 5).  Whether 
petty or grand or any other type, corruption has adverse consequences (Gupta et al. 2000, 3; 
Klitgaard, 1998: 3). For example, corruption can drive up the price and lower the level of 
government output and services (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), including the provision and 
financing of health care and education services in many countries. Furthermore, corruption can 
reduce investment in human capital (Ehrlich and Lui, 1999). Moreover, corruption can also 
reduce government revenue (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo, 1999) 
which in turn can lower the quality of publicly provided services Gupta et al. (2000, 3). As a 
result some individuals may be discourage from using these services and reduces their 
willingness to pay for them (through tax evasion), which shrinks the tax base and diminishes 
the government ability to provide quality public services.  
A review of literature reveals that corruption has been conceptualized to manifest itself 
through many characteristics including: deliberate subordination of public interest to personal 
ones; tendency of secrecy of execution; consists of situations of mutual obligations and benefits 
in monetary and other forms; interaction in a reciprocal framework between those who require 
certain decisions and those who can influence such decisions; processes of covering up 
unlawful act under a cloak of lawful justification;  contradictory dual functions: correct official 
functions and incorrect corrupt ones; use the same machinery, with which legitimate social 
functions are performed to engage in unethical behaviour, which negate public interest 
(Medard, 2003; Egbue 2006; Blundo, 2006).  
 
Brief description of corruption in Uganda 
The Transparency International 2010 report ranks Uganda as the 127th most corrupt 
country in the world with a corruption perception index of 2.5. Uganda is ranked in the 20th 
percentile in the control of corruption. According to the National Service Delivery Survey 
(2008) in Uganda, there was no action taken on 40 % of cases involving abuse of funds in the 
health sector. As is the case in the health sector, 35 %, 23.1 % and 33.8 % of the cases involving 
misuse of funds in primary education, sub-counties and local councils respectively went 
unpunished (National Service Delivery Survey 2008).   
These data provide useful clues on why there is often a chronic lack of or simply poor 
services at most government points of services. Instead of subsiding, corruption seems to be 
growing as evidenced by the Global Fund and GAVI scandal where money for HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment, prevention of malaria and immunisation of children among others 
was abused. Noteworthy, due to corruption in the health sector, for the past six years, the 
country has not fully accessed resources from the Global fund for TB, HIV/AIDS and Malaria. 
Consequently, Uganda has had limited resources and thus unable to procure ARVs and 
undertake timely community outreach and behaviour change communication interventions 
(Mugisha et al., 2010). Between 2012 and 2013, Uganda has witnessed serious corruption 
scandals. For example, a forensic audit by Auditor General Office revealed that more than 
Shs60 billion Uganda Shillings (about 24.5 Million United States Dollars) meant for the Peace, 
Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP) for Post conflict Northern Uganda was 
misappropriated by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). As a result of this scandal, Britain, 
Denmark, Ireland and Norway had already suspended aid to the office of the prime minister 
following claims that staff funnelled 10m euros ($12.7m) from an aid programme into 
private  accounts (Aljazeera, 2012).  
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 Conceptualizing Collectivism and corruption 
It has been aptly stated that “corruption in all its myriad forms arises at the intersection 
between culture, the market and the state” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 91). The drivers and 
manifestations of corruption in Uganda cannot be understood without reference to cultural 
beliefs and practices engendered that mediate or guide the interactions between different actors 
in the process of engaging in corruption. Cultural anthropologists tend to argue that these 
economic models of analysing corruption leave many questions unanswered. They argue that 
in order to broaden our understanding of the dynamics of corruption and its manifestations in 
various contexts, we need to “consider the possible role of informal behavioural rules, social 
norms and social preferences”.  
This points to the need to take into account the role culture might play in determining the 
meaning and levels of corruption in specific contexts (Seleim & Bontis, 2009). The key 
assumption is that corruption is a social construction and since culture is at the centre of our 
very existence, it should be problematised in studies and interventions against corruption. 
Others have argued that “between man and nature hung the veil of culture and he could see 
nothing save through this medium…meanings and values that lay beyond senses” (White 1940). 
Given that culture is the medium through which people perceive, understand and interpret 
things around them (Helman, 2007), we our understanding of corruption would be quite 
superficial if culture is not problematised. However, these cultural constructions and meanings 
are not static; they keep changing i.e. they are uncertain and unstable. As James Peacock1 
argues,” human life should be viewed as a whole configuration interwoven of many forces and 
aspects, all organized by culture (Peacock 2001, 1).  
In this paper, I argue that the drivers and manifestations of corruption in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) states like Uganda cannot be understood without reference to the socio-cultural 
context of collectivism. Within specific contexts of collectivism, actions that qualify to be 
corruption (i.e., abuse of power for private gain) may be acceptable if the private gain is shared 
with those in one’s community.  
In many collectivist cultures (Hofstede, 1991; Ikwenobe, 2006), acceptance or rejection 
of corruption depends on the contextual interpretations of the act and the perception and 
meaning attached to the act. In collectivism, an individual is obligated to contribute to the 
community, not only because it is expected of him or her but because the “community is him 
or her” (Verhoef and Micheal 1997, p. 396 cited in Ikwenobe, 2006 ; also see Hofstede, 1991). 
The concept of a person in the African collectivist world-view is “first and most importantly 
that of the community…this means not that the individual is selfless, but that the self is the 
community” (Verhoef and Micheal 1997, 396 cited in Ikwenobe, 2006). Hofstede (1991, 51)  
observes that “collectivism… pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are 
integrated into strong, cohesive groups which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect 
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty”.  
Two important aspects of collectivism--the suppression of the self in the interest of the 
community or “the idea that the identity of an individual is not separable from the socio-cultural 
environment” (Ikwenobe 2006, 53) and the notion of “we are” as a basis for defining identity 
instead of “I am. In Collectivism, the cultural ideal is “I am because you are” (Tschudi 2006). 
This is an important inspiration that is in some contexts (e.g. South Africa) is linked to the 
African concept ubuntu that was popularised by Bishop Tutu (1999) in advocating and 
executing the work under Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  Tutu prefers to express 
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 the ubuntu using the metaphor “my humanity is intrinsically related to that of other persons”. 
He presents ubuntu as an African alternative to the Cartesian “I think, therefore I am” versus “I 
am human because I belong”.   
Tutu tells us that ubuntu can be used to describe a personal quality: A person with ubuntu 
is open and accessible for others, primed with a certainty deriving from the experience of 
belonging to a larger unity. Thus collectivism tends to espouse the demands or aspirations of 
the community to be superior over and above those of the individual. In this context, man is 
viewed as an entity that is not necessary an end to itself but rather a tool to serve the ends of 
others. In this way, collectivism seems to ignore the agency of individuals which is used to as 
a resource to maneuver structures and norms in order to achieve their goals. This notion of 
collectivism and how it affects individual responsibility for actions (Cullen, Johnson, and 
Parboteeah 2007; Mazar and Aggarwal 2011) such as corruption has not been effectively 
explored (Blundo, 2006).  
 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
2. 1. Design  
This paper is based on a study which employed an exploratory and descriptive a 
qualitative study design because it is a method of choice to study meaning(s) (Hardon et al., 
2001) and I wanted to study the meaning of corruption in the context of collectivism. In 
addition, this being a cultural study we employed qualitative methods because qualitative 
research is suitable for delving into deep questions of subjective experience (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000).  
The area of study was Kampala District, which is located in the central region of Uganda. 
It is the capital city and largely has urban characteristics with many slum settlements. About 60 
% of the population  living in Kampala are Baganda and belong to the Bantu tribes. 
 The city has a population of about 2.5 million people (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 
2010). It hosts all the government ministries and its the headquarter of most projects and 
programs that have relatively big budgets. It is also the epi-centre of business ranging from 
service industries, agro-processing, construction and big markets (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 
2010). 
 
2. 2. Sampling and Participants  
Study participants were purposive selected because they needed to have the relevant 
characteristics, experiences and knowledge to share about the research questions (Hardon et al., 
2001). Key informants were informants were male and female community members who were 
perceived to have the relevant characteristics as well as experiences to share in relation to the 
key research issues.  
The key informants were largely drawn from Local council executive members, civil 
servants, members of Parliament, researchers and academicians especially from the Social 
Sciences and Humanities, Makerere University.  
These were because they were perceived to have information and experiences to share 
with us in relation to the key research issues. 
2. 3. Data collection  
The main methods of data collection were key informant interviews (KIs). Key informant 
interviews were employed because they allow collection of data on new areas of study (Bloar 
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 and Wood, 2006). Key informant interviews were also engaged to generate expert views 
(Hardon et al., 2001) on issues corruption and collectivism. KI interview was conducted in 
English because the target group could speak English fluently.  
 
2. 3. 1. Data Analysis 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. The approach used in data analysis was 
thematic and content thematic analysis (Gilbert, 2008). Data collected from key informant 
interviews were coded to develop category systems. This was followed by creating sub-
categories from each of these main categories that were developed (Gilbert, 2008).  
 
2. 3. 2. Ethics 
Ethical approval was sought and given by the Uganda National Council for Science and 
Technology review board before conducting the study.  Informed consent was sought from all 
the study informants before their participation in the study. Study participants were informed 
about the purpose of the study, assured voluntary participation and confidentiality. 
 
 
3.  STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The meaning and perception of corruption 
The study found that corruption was decribed using many different terms in various 
alnguages but also various contexts in the same language. It was common to disguise it by using 
terms that make it less stigmatizing and difficult to define as theft, extortion, or morally 
unacceptable. One can argue that this is part of the process of normalising practices related to 
corruption. The terms used to disguise or describe corruption practices normalize corruption 
and vary from one area to the other and from person to person depending on the context of the 
transaction. These terms were however, largely linked to the conception of corruption inrespect 
to informal payments especially in the context of seeking services from the public sector. The 
terms commonly used across most areas in demanding for informal payments include: Kitu 
Kidogo (Swahili word implying give something), Chai (tea), lunch, air time, and transport. 
Given that our study participants were drawn from across many languages, many used terms in 
the local language and then gave their English equivalents. Among the Acholi, Alur and Langi 
in Northern Uganda the terms Piny Moko (give something), kilongo, lep picu, and Lak Kalam 
(refill my ink) may be used while the Japadhola (Luo) in Tororo district use piny Moro. In the 
central region (Buganda) terms such as genda e’kasawo (literally meaning get me some money), 
ba’muyiya (be creative and do something), yogera olulimi lwebatergera (meaning speak the 
language that is ‘understandable’. In this context, the speaking the language refers to giving 
cash before narrating one’s health problem) and vayo gyoli (implying come to my level and get 
me some money from your bag or wallet) and Kyalako e’Bukoma Nsimbi (literally meaning 
give money). Bukoma Nsimbi is a village in Buganda, which if literally translated means where 
money stops and is often cited in reference unofficial payments. As service users line up, 
mentioning Bukoma Nsimbi signals to them that they will need to pay some money to access 
services. Others use terms such as scratch my back, oil my knees, and be a man or woman of 
the people in reference to unofficial payments. 
In alerting their colleagues that a service user has no money, service providers in central 
region districts were said to use the term Talina Musayi literally meaning that he/she has a low 
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 blood, which in their circles means the person has no money) (see Transparency International, 
Uganda 2011). 
The basic and simplest meaning of corruption was that, corruption is the abuse of office 
for personal/selfish reasons as an individual. The perception of corruption however, became 
complex when it was perceived not to just benefit the person (personal or private gain) but the 
benefits were perceived to be shared by others including extended family, lineage and even 
community.  
Normally in civil service your superior/supervisor introduces the corrupt idea by 
sending you to bring him or her money or expecting money from you as they deploy 
you common in traffic police where officers who are deployed are expected to report 
to their superiors with money from the field. Your colleagues too entice you into 
corruption. Your family and relatives also urge you to steal like others and also 
immerse wealth like other corrupt officials (Retired Commissioner in the Public 
Service) 
This study participant brings in the perceptive of the family and your peers encouraging 
you to steal not just for your sake but also for their benefit. In this context, we also need to 
appreciate that in Africa and Uganda in particular, the concept of family is that of an extended 
family. In this case, the stealing is perceived by some not only for personal again but for “our 
gain” as friends, family or lineage (also see Laurent 2000, 234; Blundo 2006, 33). This may 
bring into question the meaning of person or person-hood in different cultures. For example, in 
most of Sub-Saharan Africa, the person is not an individual but he sees himself as an individual 
in the context of a community. In other words the self is not visible like in societies in the 
“West”. The individual is not separable and clearly separated from the extended family and 
community. Thus in some cases, like the respondent has noted corruption is a collective racket 
instigated and planned by the family and peers.  
This perception of corruption only partially concurs with the Transparency International 
definition of corruption which conceptualizes corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain which eventually hurts everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a 
position of authority” (Transparency International UK, 2011:1). In the context of collectivism, 
where the family and community may to a certain extent for context specific reasons be 
encouraging someone to engage in corruption for the benefit of the family, lineage or 
community, this definition may be inadequate.  
The study found that corruption is perceived differently by various study participants. 
Some participants perceived corruption to be linked to poverty dynamics but in other cases, 
corruption was related to the expectations people have of public officials and politicians. It was 
also linked to how people perceive government and the state – citizen social contract 
relationship. In the perception of some of our study participants, public officials are expected 
to be rich even when they are under paid. The people are not interested where one gets the 
money as long they have it.  
The public glorifies the corrupt and look down upon the poor but honest and ethical civil 
servants forcing many to join corruption to avoid being condemned by the society if they 
don’t get rich (Retired Commissioner, Public Service). 
There was a perception by some study participants that government is impersonal and 
abstract. It is not frequently uncommon for people not to perceive state resources as their public 
resources. This may also point to issues related to the absence or legitimacy of the state to the 
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 people in a given community or region (also see Medard, 2002). The perception that 
government is abstract would mean that “when you steal from governments you are stealing 
from nobody”. 
Because government is impersonal, you cannot identify with it. Our minds are not 
tuned to institutions of government, it is absent. If you steal from something abstract, 
you are not touched or cannot be felt…Community sanctions about local actions of 
stealing are there and practiced, but they do not know how to react when one steals 
from government (Senior Lecturer, Department of Peace and Religious Studies) 
To some study participants, corruption was also perceived to be an alien concept and 
linked to the “West”. They found it difficult to understood it in an “African setting” like 
Uganda. One of the respondents argued that: 
The conceptualization of corruption is from the Western angle – our society 
expressions are to do with acquisition or theft.  Pastoralists – when they raid cattle – 
they look at it as acquisition while others look at it as theft. We need to understand 
what corruption is in the African setting. The current conceptualization is too alien – it 
is like defining poverty in form of dollars in a non-cash economy.  (Senior Lecturer 1, 
Department of Political Science) 
If we relate the quote about government being personal and abstract, making it complex 
for people to perceive someone stealing from government as stealing from any one or even 
stealing from them – because government would be their trustee and the above quote which 
perceives corruption as alien then this may call for contextualization of corruption in settings 
where the state is perceived as not representing the interests of the community. Thus in contexts 
where public resources are not perceived by the population as their resources or where public 
resources are perceived by the communities as “actually private resources that are used by those 
in charge of the state as more or less their own private resources”, the meaning of public 
resources becomes more complicated. 
This is similar to what Medard calls a “neo-patrimonial of regulation found in 
authoritarian regimes which ensures relative political stability as long as corruption reproduces 
itself in situations characterized by an admittedly precarious balance between extraction and 
redistribution” (Blundo, 2006, 51; also see Medard, 2002, 2003). 
State failure to provide basic social services as a driver of corruption has led to perception of 
elected representatives as providers rather than facilitators of access to services through 
enabling policies and legislation. 
The study findings suggest that state failure to provide basic social services or to full fill 
the state citizen contract has complicated the relationship between people and their elected 
representatives. Instead of people looking up-to-the state for provision of social services, they 
seem to actually look-up-to individual elected representatives for provision of these services. 
For example, Members of parliament tended to argue that corruption is perpetuated by state 
failure to provide basic services to the population. It was noted that because of this failure, the 
electorate look up to their elected representatives to provide basic services. Those who fail to 
do so would be regarded as non performers and would therefore be susceptible to losing their 
seats. Thus the conceptualization by the electorate of the role of a Member of Parliament as 
provider could be among the factors making members of parliament and other elected leaders 
to engage in corruption. This could also explain why as long as a Member of Parliament or a 
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 Cabinet Minister steals public funds but is giving hand outs to his or her electorate, he is 
considered a “hero not a thief”. The electorate perceives leaders as providers rather than 
facilitators of access to services. During the course of the study, it was observed that elected 
councilors are under a lot of stress to provide things that are not constitutionally under their 
mandate to offer to the electorate. Although the roles of elected representatives ranging from 
Members of Parliament, District elected representatives at local government levels are clearly 
stipulated in the Local Government Act and the Constitution, the attitudes of both the electorate 
and the elected representatives seem to be at variance with these formal roles.  
It is common to find elected representatives making promises that are far-fetched from 
their mandate and for which they are not vote controllers in terms of resource allocation. Thus 
the expectations of the electorate place a lot of pressure on the elected leaders. This sometimes 
forces leaders to engage in corruption because they have to look for funds by all means to try 
and fulfill their promises to the electorate. The elected representatives and electorate are 
therefore trapped into an informal political discourse that has implications for the ability of 
elected representatives to perform their formal responsibilities as well as culturally 
contextualized responsibilities that appeal to their electorate. The dilemma for the councilors 
is that if the culturally underpinned expectations of the voters are not met, they may endanger 
the chances of elected representatives being re-elected. This may be partly driven by the reality 
that a proportion of voters may not know the roles and responsibilities of the elected councilors 
(also see Neema and Bukuluki, 2011). 
Government is not providing the basic needs to the societies. People get little money 
and they use their offices to compensate themselves. When you are holding a position 
and you do not help your people then they take you not to be a performer. (Key 
informant interview, Member of Parliament from one of Counties in West Nile Sub-
region)  
Furthermore, the study findings established that society expects elected officials to fulfill 
their promises made during campaign for political offices. During campaigns aspirants promise 
to construct roads and to improve service delivery in their constituency. These promises are 
outside the mandate of elected leaders.  
The other societal expectation is that an elected person should provide for society. This 
puts them in jeopardy. It is not the mandate of an elected official to provide. He is 
supposed to articulate the concerns of society in the public space. But to say that he 
provides for weddings, bridges, burials, this means that he has to use his personal 
resources yet this is not possible to use personal resources to provide to society and 
simply does not work – some people have overstretched by trying to provide because of 
society expectations. (Key informant interview with an Associate Professor, Department 
of Political Science) 
Some politicians go for political campaigns and say if you elected me, you will never 
see any pothole in this road. Promising what they can’t do and they are promising what 
they have no mandate to do. You may find some political leader if he can’t do it but he 
has influence and so he can influence and they begin diverting a planned activity 
somewhere to what fits their political interests. If this marrum road was supposed to be 
graded, somebody influences the other politician to divert the planned road to be graded 
to another road. Others may want to use their resources which they don’t have them then 
they end up stealing. So these politicians sometimes what they promised during the 
elections pushes them to do what they may not have done because they promise heaven 
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 on earth. (Key informant interview with Board Member, Transparency International 
Uganda) 
These expectations make public officials and elected officials strive to meet them amidst 
scarce financial resources. This lays traps for these officials to engage in corruption related 
practices. It was noted that elected officials are expected by society to provide and support in 
every aspect to their electorate and constituency. Some of the key areas where elected officials 
are required to provide and give support include school fees, burial expenses, funeral rites, 
worship centers etc.  
 Elected officials are expected to provide and support in every aspect to their electorate 
and constituency by giving them jobs, financial contribution for activities like burial 
expense, weddings, last funeral rites, school fees, award of contracts etc to his 
relatives, tribe mates, clan mates which fuels tribal patronage and have pressure 
elected public officials to embezzle public resources (Retired Commissioner Public 
Service). 
Study participants observed that when public and elected officials fails to address the 
expectation of society, they are accused of being self centered thus in order to meet societal 
expectations both public and elected officials are pressured into engaging in corruption.  
Society expects an elected official or public official to be able to solve their personal 
problems including paying school fees for children, medical bills etc. And when they 
do not meet these expectations, they are accused of being self centered. These pressure 
force public officials to engage in acts of corruption (Chief of Party, for a large NGO 
in Uganda). 
Furthermore, the study findings established that political offices have been 
commercialized. The commercialization is linked to how the politicians and local leaders 
perceive their roles. The community because of its collectivism tendencies as well as state 
failure to provide services perceives elected representatives as chiefs. Similarly, elected 
representatives seem to have accepted this position even when it is at variance with their 
constitutional roles. The notion of what is commonly called individual merit that started in the 
early 1990s when the National Resistance Movement came to power was built on the notion 
that you need to show what you have done for your community to convince them that you are 
the best candidate. This meritocracy was not necessarily linked to representation of people’s 
ideas and needs in Parliament but linked in many cases to the material things and infrastructural 
projects like schools, roads, water sources that you have put in place for your community. The 
process of getting into public offices is therefore expensive. The people vying for political 
offices buy votes and make huge promises in order to be elected. Those who get elected may 
become corrupt in order to recover their expenses. As elections draws near, incumbent 
politicians steal money in preparation for the elections as they have to buy voters.  
Corruption starts with elected officials, the people vying for political offices make wild 
promises during the campaigns. They are unprincipled, they make wild promises just 
premised to winning an election and they tell what the electorate want to hear even when 
they know its outside their mandate and not able to deliver on their promises and without 
telling them lies one may not win election. On the other hand, they buy votes, and when 
they get into offices they get corrupted in order to recoup their initial investment and 
enrich themselves and it becomes a vicious circle. (Retired Commissioner, Public 
Service) 
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 Another study participant further argued that the society looks at the positions of elected 
leaders as jobs rather than service to society and that the process of acquiring these positions is 
perceived as investment for enriching elected officials.  
 Expectation of society of the elected leader; They look at their positions as jobs rather 
than service to society and the process of acquiring these position is perceived as 
investment for self enrichment. The people on the other hand look at the election 
process as a way of getting something from the aspiring politician. The electorate has 
to be paid or bribed to vote for a candidate and expect to continue being bribed. As 
such the candidate who is able to spend more money will have the most number of 
votes.  In doing so, some candidates will have their assets auctioned and when they get 
elected, they will have no choice but to engage in acts of corruption to recoup what 
they spent! Most voters tend to vote money not issues (Senior Official, Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development) 
 
3. 1. Collectivism, reciprocity and corruption 
The study established several meanings of corruption in the context of collectivism. It 
revealed that some cultural practices like “envuujo in kiganda” culture meaning “giving gifts 
to people with power like chiefs, land lords” have become building blocks for corruption. In 
addition, proverbs like “akuwa obwami aba akuwadde kulya” which literally means, “one who 
makes you a chief or who gives you a position of substance or power in society has given you 
a platform to eat” seems to indirectly reinforce practices that could lead those elected into office 
or promoted to high positions in the Public Service to become corrupt. 
Abuse of the notion of reciprocity: reciprocity is central in many African cultures but it 
can be abused by public officials. The Culture for example, allows acceptance of gifts. 
Rejection of the gift would be demeaning because reciprocity is considered a natural thing in 
African culture.  
It is common for public official to expect reciprocity after delivering a service to the 
public, say processed a license, permits, visas etc. There is a tendency of members 
of the community to reciprocate by giving gifts in form of cash which sometimes 
become routine and public officials then expect from everybody thus promoting 
corruption in public service (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science). 
Kinship, social ties, networks and vulnerability of public officials to corruption 
Several study participants noted that despite the positive attributes of the extended family 
such as being there for kinsmen and women during turbulent times, the unending social and 
material needs of the kinsmen/relatives and demands for reciprocity in the traditional extended 
families put a lot of pressure on elected officials and public servants. 
Civil servants and Politicians have pressure to cater for their basic and strategic needs of 
their relatives. Several study participants noted that relatives, believe that when one of their 
own extended family or kinship is well placed in the central or local government establishment; 
they have to get jobs, money, tenders and many favors. This has made a number of politicians 
and technocrats in the public service and local government engage in corruption.  
The extended family obligations embedded into “African cultures” in many African 
countries including Uganda demand for reciprocity and unquestionable royalty to your clan and 
extended family members (Hofstede, 1991; Gyekye, 1996; Ikwenobe, 2006).  For example a 
husband is expected to have money to support his in-laws whenever they have a financial need. 
In Luganda there is a demeaning proverb for a poor in-law; “Omuko Omwanvu ye ayasa enku 
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 ku buuko”. Literally meaning that; “it is a poor son-in-law who does donkey work at the home 
of his father in-law”. Therefore gender norms around masculinity and an ideal man or son-in-
law makes Public servants and elected leaders susceptible to stealing in order to meet the 
exepectations of their in-laws. 
In addition, peer pressure within people working for central government, Local 
government and the civil society as well as pressure within the family for civil servants and 
politicians to leave beyond their means was perceived as a key driver of corruption. 
“…unending social needs of our traditional extended families, the drive to compete or 
outcompete our peers in terms of material wealth beyond what our incomes can 
ordinarily manage, are some of the factors that push people to engage in illicit acts of 
wealth acquisition. There are cases where wives have forced husbands to engage 
corruption to even up with people that are esteemed in society. In fact even in 
churches, people who give more offertories are treated differently…” (Senior 
manager, for one of the big Non Government Organisations) 
A high expectation from the many dependents associated with extended family was 
perceived as a driver of corruption. One of the respondents noted that: 
“One person with a reasonable income is supporting many others because of extended 
family thing promoting the “we thing”. It comes about because many people cannot 
earn a living – so many people use collectivism to get to you. We owe our success to 
others and we pay back to society by helping others. The problem is that we end up in 
unconventional methods such stealing, embezzling to get resources to support the many 
dependents. The dependents we support – see nothing wrong with stealing money, the 
villagers are not concerned about how you get the money as a relative or Member of 
Parliament as long as you support their needs” (Member of Parliament, for one of the 
constituencies in Central Region).  
Another study participant observed that in the African setting, even the elite find it very 
difficult to complain or re-think his position on issues of reciprocity and establishing boundaries 
between the nuclear and extended family. Thus the borders between the nuclear and extended 
family and the community are porous. 
 “This concept of communalism is what Africans define themselves to be – clan 
system, extended family; issue of who are my people, children of your brother are your 
children and this puts pressure on you, but who cares. You cannot go to your mother 
and complain that your back is breaking because of the children of your brother or 
sister. You are supposed to meet the needs and that is it. You cannot complain and you 
cannot re-think your role. Any attempt to do that will be interpreted as being insensitive 
– that you have no heart. Therefore Members of Parliament and other public officials 
are thus forced to be corrupt to address the needs of dependants” (Senior Lecturer, 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology). 
Perception of Ideal Man in society and predisposition to corruption 
The study revealed that the masculinity and gender norms associated with “being a man 
or ideal man” in society such as Uganda carries with it expectations and responsibilities which 
may ultimately predispose a man to corruption practices. Society expects a man to have wealth 
and the society does not mind about the source of the wealth. The Society gratifies the corrupt 
calling them heroes and ridicules the non-corrupt calling them stupid! A man is expected to 
have a big house, second home, wife(s), and his children should go to good/expensive schools, 
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 have a big car. Being a man means that you are a provider. Society expects you to have ability 
to provide for your immediate family, your parents’ family and the family of your wife.  
 If you are not able to provide for your family – or you are unsuccessful you are not 
considered a man.  Men go over because they pushed to be successful and to succeed. 
The idea of a man is not just a physical being. “Omushaija or obushaija abweteera”. 
If you are a man you must demonstrate that you are man. You must demonstrate 
success through harvest, cow decent house, banana plantation and coffee. This drives 
some men crazy and sometimes corrupt - craving for success by all means. 
Expectations of society on Person who is responsible and can take care of others. 
(Associate Professor, Department of Political Science)  
It is true that expectations and responsibilities of being a man predispose men to be 
corrupt because they look at a man as a bread winner. A man is expected to do 
everything (Member of Parliament, one of the Constituencies, Central Region).  
Today if I am made a big person in a big office responsible over huge sums of money. 
All my friends, my family especially my wife and children and my clansmen will now 
be looking at me as a source of earning that they can easily come to me for support 
and I must give that support. Sometimes I may also want to do the same, but in the 
process I will be overstretching myself to make everybody happy which I can’t 
maintain. So sometimes to be a man you must manage every problem financially yet 
you can give advice without money and someone gets out of the problem. The moment 
you fail you overstretch yourself and you think otherwise, you end up making false 
claims, even failing to account for money, embezzling money because you want to 
fulfill the demands of your family, relatives and friends. (Board Member, 
Transparency International Uganda Board) 
Using your networks/social ties as an advantage over others not perceived as corruption in 
some collectivistic settings:  
Collectivism and its socialization processes have made some people blind to corruption 
especially in awarding jobs and contracts. Several study participants argued that if a friend or a 
relative approaches you for a job when you are in a public servant but he or she has the requisite 
qualification and you use your power or position to make this person get a job then this is an 
issue to do with using your networks and does not amount to corruption. It is rather maximizing 
your social capital to benefit people who are qualified but close to you. Participants argued that 
where a person approaches you and this person is incompetent and without requisite 
qualification and you use your power or position to make this friend or relative acquire a job 
then that would be corruption. This was further explained more precisely by one of the 
respondents. 
A combination of connections and qualifications should be fine, but where people are 
not qualified but they are employed because of their relatives. If they take undue 
advantage, then that would be corruption. But if somebody gets through the rigors of 
recruitment and gets a small push – that should not be corruption. (Associate Professor, 
Department of Political Science) 
Using Social ties to elude Justice for corruption related practices: 
Social ties are used as a tool or shield for protection against prosecution in the formal 
retributive Courts of Law. This is especially for those with relatives, close friends or 
connections in government. It was noted by some study participants that if the corrupt official 
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 is perceived as still politically useful i.e. still capable of mobilizing the electorate for votes, he 
or she will be protected by those at the helm of the state.  
“…it is not uncommon that people in influential public positions bent the rules to favor 
their in-laws, sisters or clan mates”. This thread runs through from the highest to the lowest 
public office. (Chief of Party, for one of the large NGOs) 
Agency vs. collectivism:  
Some study participants disagreed with this notion of saying that people are hostage of 
collectivism and therefore cannot exercise their agency. They noted that politicians and public 
servants are simply abusing collectivism and using it to steal and amass wealth. These study 
participants observed that it is debatable if all the funds accruing from corruption related 
deals/scandals are used to support kinship networks. They argued that engaging in corruption 
and tolerating those who do it is a matter of attitude rather than being hostage of collectivism. 
Some public officials irrespective of social ties may reject corruption. The study participant 
further explained this debate. 
When you look at cases of corruption – it is not necessary – net works – it is debatable if 
the stolen money is used to support kinship networks. It may go more into attitude – whether 
corrupt or not you can support the network. The network could be an incentive to get involved 
in corruption but it is an issue of attitude – you can do the responsibility without being corrupt. 
(Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science) 
 
3. 2. Useful Cultural resources that can be utilize in the struggle against corruption in 
        the context of collectivism  
There are several useful cultural practices that the study established that can be utilized 
in the struggle against corruption in a collectivist society like Uganda. Among the useful 
cultural resources found was cultural norm. The study participants revealed that every tribe in 
Uganda preaches morality to the young people.   
Cultural norms can be used. In every culture of the tribes in Uganda the concept of 
morality is key, and many traditional proverbs promotes equity, integrity, fairness, 
responsiveness, participation etc which can be evoked to promote transparency, 
accountability and integrity. Young people are supposed to be obedient to cultural 
norms and to elders, thieves are under looked and despised (Retired Commissioner 
Public Service) 
It was further noted that religious teachings are against stealing and exploitation.  
Religious values teach Christians to avoid stealing. However, the church can still rise 
up against corruption. (Senior Official, Uganda National commission for UNESCO) 
The study participants argued that societal values even within collectivism are against 
stealing and thieves. However it also pointed out that social cohesion is no longer strong as it 
used to be.  
Our societal values are against thieves – the community prefers people to help others 
but not necessarily though stealing. In the traditional African society, the social control 
mechanisms and norms can be used but we are in a changed society; there is no longer 
social cohesion. What we need is a political mechanism not social or cultural resources 
because they have been all eroded. We are living in a different society all together. 
(Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science). 
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 The study revealed that stigmatizing the corrupt and their families is one of the cultural 
resources that ought to be used to fight corruption.  
The Politician who engaged in corruption scandals, are publically stigmatized, their 
families are stigmatized for example by virtue of mentioning a corrupt minister, there 
is already social stigma. When you are a child of a corrupt minister in a secondary 
school and you annoy, another child, the response would be what are you talking when 
your father is even a thief he stole public money. See the stigma this type of child will 
go through. If the society decides to be collective against you because of something 
you are doing, you are finished. (Member of Parliament representing one of the 
marginalized groups).  
The study findings further revealed that societal respect for faithful and trustworthy public 
officials is another useful cultural resource for the fight against corruption in a collectivist 
society like Uganda. The study participant argued that society respects those who are faithful 
and trustworthy and not those who steal public funds.  
In our society, people will respect you if you are faithful, if you are trustworthy. Our 
culture does not support people to steal or to cheat. But this culture is being killed by 
the very people, the modern youths and the old people. And the youths are also looking 
at the old people and they are saying if this man went to parliament and he has amassed 
wealth in four years, if I became minister I also want to look like him. So cultural 
values are getting lost or eroded because of peer influence. Very few people are now 
stuck to them yet cultural values would have helped us to safe guard our people from 
stealing public funds. (Board Member, Transparency International Uganda). 
 
 
4.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study observed that collectivism especially when viewed in terms of its socialization 
processes and the demands it puts upon individuals, families and communities may predispose 
them (public officials, elected leaders) to engage in corruption (also see Laurent, 2000, 234). 
The study also shows collectivism does not in itself encourage anyone to engage in corruption 
per say. Individual public servants and politicians are not necessarily taken hostage. They have 
their own choices that they can make to remain corruption free irrespective of the many drivers 
in a collectivistic context that may make them vulnerable to corruption (also see Anders 2005, 
213). In other words, collectivism cannot be taken as an excuse for engaging in the vice of 
corruption. There were debates among study participants that seemed to suggest that public 
servants and elected representatives are taking advantage of communities under the guise or 
cover of collectivism to engage in corruption related behaviours (also see Anders 2005, 213; 
Blundo, 2006, 33). Viewed from this perceptive, corruption is an issue of attitude of the political 
leaders and public servants in their interaction with families and communities. This is similar 
to the argument by Anders that: “on the contrary, far from being prisoners of social obligations, 
social actors retain a certain margin of maneuver and use this argument to justify their illicit 
practices” (Anders, 2005, 213; also see Blundo 2006, 33-35). 
State failure to fulfill its citizen-state social contract of providing basic social services 
comes out quite clearly as a key concern in making elected officials susceptible to use all means 
possible to do things outside their mandate to provide for the communities. The attitude of the 
community towards elected leaders continues in many respects to perceive them as 
40 Volume 5
 chiefs/providers rather than representatives in Local Councils or the Parliament. Although this 
is not an excuse for engaging in corruption, it provides an enabling environment and may give 
politicians an excuse to abuse “public Resources”. As rightly pointed out by Anders, a detailed 
study of the social life of public workers helps to enhance our understanding of the intricate and 
complex nature – relationship of both the state and corruption (Anders, 2005, 192) in 
collectivistic settings. 
State legitimacy or state absence in the daily lives of communities and how it relates to 
the communities perception of the state or government resources is an interesting issue for 
further research. If the state is not perceived as a trustee for the community but perceived as 
belonging to the political and military elite in power, it raises the question of what is then the 
state and whose interests it serves. It also puts the community in some kind of dilemma when 
it comes to perception of what constitutes public resources. Thus if public resources are actually 
not perceived by the citizenry as so, then meaning and parameters for measuring corruption as 
applied in (and by) the “West” may not make sense.  
This is more so in the context of collectivism especially in communities where there are 
failed states or where state legitimacy particularly measured in terms of the state fulfilling its 
state-citizen social contract is in question. This argument augurs well with the issues raised by 
Jean Francois Medard while discussing the concept of neo-patrimonialism which “characterizes 
the contradictory nature of the African states in which processes of bureaucratization co-exist 
with the patrimonial management of public resources” (Medard, 1990, 27 cited by Blundo, 
2006). In essence, although the Constitutions of African states acknowledge the distinction 
between public and private spheres, this division is not respected or is often ignored in concrete 
political practices of the “African” leaders (Medard, 2002; Blundo, 2006). Seen from this 
perspective, I agree with Medard’s notion that neo-patrionalism show signs of the failure of the 
institutionalization of the state in Africa (Medard, 2003; also see Blundo, 2006, 21).  
Similarly, our findings are in agreement with Blundo (2006)’s observation that the 
informalisation tendencies of the bureaucracy that characterize political practices of some 
African states makes the state both a “shadow and real”. “It does not constitute a pale copy or 
distortion of the Weberain state but represents something radically different” (Blundo 2006, 
22). It emerges from the study that gender is one of the central concepts in understanding the 
dynamics and drivers of corruption in the context of collectivism. It is plausible that the 
masculinity and gender norms constructed around an ideal man in the “African” context and 
the expectations that come with them predispose people to engaging in corruption related 
practices. This may help to explain the masculine face of corruption (also see Dollar et al, 1999; 
Transparency International 2009).   
This study also demonstrates that we should not be blinded to only focus on the drivers 
of corruption in the context of collectivism (Cullen, Johnson, and Parboteeah 2007) and ignore 
the cultural resources within collectivism that can be harnessed in the struggle against 
corruption. There is limited research on cultural resources for fighting corruption yet these are 
common place in the “African” collectivistic values stemming from culture and religion as well 
as the entire socialization process (Hofstede, 1991; Gyekye, 1996; Ikwenobe, 2006).  
In this paper, I argue that the drivers and manifestations of corruption in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) states like Uganda can at best be understood by reference to the socio-cultural 
context of these societies. As seen from the perspectives of study participants, specific contexts 
of collectivism, actions that qualify to be corruption may be seen by some community members 
as acceptable if the private gain is perceived to be actually public because it is going to be 
shared with those in one’s community. If this is seen from the perspective that an individual is 
obligated to contribute to the community, not only because it is expected of him or her but 
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 because the “community is him or her” (Verhoef and Micheal 1997, p. 396; also see Hofstede, 
1991; Ikwenobe, 2006).  
From an academic perspective, it has been noted that few anthropological work 
problematising the issue of culture, its different levels and its complexity (Helman 2007) has 
been done on the phenomenon of corruption in Africa. As Giorgio Blundo noted while 
commenting about “Africanist” Anthropology and corruption;  
...Despite being the first academic discipline to have set foot on the African soil, 
anthropology is the one that has devoted least attention to the subject of corruption 
there...(Blundo, 2006: 16-17) 
I conclude by stating that the issue of culture and context is imperative in aiding 
understanding of the latent and manifest aspects of corruption, more so in the context of 
collectivism in Uganda. There is therefore need to problematise culture and context in studying 
corruption in all its forms (also see Van der Geest 1984). 
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